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In a recent paper in this journal, Kamien and Zang (1990) endogenize the de-
cision to merge by firms producing substitutes in a quantity-setting oligopoly. The
equilibrium market structure is obtained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-
sta e game.1 In the first stage of the game, each of the n firm owners announces a
vec or of bids for each of the other firms and an asking price for his own firm. Each
firm for which some bid exceeds its asking price is then sold to the highest bidder
for the value of the bid (subject to a rule for resolving ties). In the second stage,
quantity competition takes place given the market structure resulting from the first
stage. Kamien and Zang show that some mergers will not occur as an equilibrium
of this merger game.
Market forces limit the degree to which an industry may be monopolized by
acquisition. For example, consider an industry where three firms produce perfect
substitutes with identical, linear total cost functions. Assume the firms face lin-
ear demand. Then in the Kamien and Zang model neither a two-firm merger nor
a merger to monopoly will occur endogenously. If' two firms merged, then it fol-
lows from the results in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (this journal, 1983) that
the merged entity would earn smaller profits than its components did prior to the
merger. As we show below, mergers with this characteristic never occur in Kamien
and Zang's model. Moreover three firms cannot merge since no firm can afford to
pay the other two what each firm conjectures it could earn as the lone holdout. The
policy implication drawn from this result is that some socially undesirable mergers
need not be of concern since they will fail to occur endogenously.
This result, however, raises a quite different concern: some socially desirable
mergers will also fail to occur endogenously. In illustrating this point, we gener-
alize their analysis to price competition with perfect complements and clarify the
link between this endogenous merger model and the "exogenous merger" literature
following Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (hereafter, SSR).
2 The Model
Mergers are sometimes socially desirable. Some economize on fixed costs. Oth-
ers eliminate adverse pecuniary externalities. We focus here on the latter case.
Frequently, the good or service a customer wants requires dealing with several firms
simultaneously. For example, the customer may want gas, electricity, or cargo
shipped from point A to point B but segments of the pipeline, cable or railroad
track are owned by different firms char ing separate fees. The charge to get some-
thing shipped from A to B is therefore the sum of the fees set by the owners of the
different segments.
The firms in each of these examples sell perfect complements. If they set prices
simultaneously, the equilibrium of the game is what Cournot (1838) first identi-
fied in his long-neglected example of copper and zinc producers selling to someone
wanting brass.2 For convenience, we will use the railroad example hereafter. As
described in Vellturo (1988), the U.S. government was for decades unable to induce
railroads adjoining end-to-end to "consolidate" despite the efficiency gains which
such mergers would have created. We will show that this refusal to consolidate
- even when consolidation would be socially beneficial - is precisely what the
'Their so-called decentralized game is actually a three-stage game. We restrict our attention here
to their centralized game, which reduces to a two-stage game.
2See Cournot's treatment of "Mutual Relations of Producers" in his chapter 9. Elaborating
on Cournot's example, Sonnenschein (1968) showed that whatever may be said about quantity
competition with perfect substitutes can be applied to price competition with perfect complements
by simply interchanging the role of prices and quantities.
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Kamien and Zang result sometimes implies when firms selling perfect complements
compete in price.
Assume there are originally n identical segments of track owned by n different
players. Each simultaneously sets fares on his own segment. As in Kamien and Zang,
assume that the n firms in the industry have constant marginal cost of production,
denoted c. There are no fixed costs.
Suppose in the second stage a player controls a subset s < n of the firms, in the
sense that he centralizes the decision concerning the behavior of those s firms. In
quantity competition, Kamien and Zang assumed he chooses the aggregate output
of those firms in order to maximize their joint profit. In price competition, we
assume he chooses the aggregate price (the sum of the fares on each segment) in
order to maximize joint profit.
Given the assumption of linear, identical cost functions, the cost to the owner of
several firms of producing a given aggregate output is independent of the interfirm
distribution of output between his firms. Since each firm faces the same price and
this price depends only on aggregate production, the profit of a player controlling
more than one firm in quantity competition depends only on the aggregate output
he produces and not on which firms are used to produce it. Hence, Kamien and
Zang assume for simplicity that he sets to zero the output of all but one of his firms.
Similarly, in price competition with perfect complements, since the owner of
each segment of adjoining track sells the same volume and this volume depends
only on the aggregate price, the profit of a player controlling more than one firm
depends only on the aggregate price he charges and not on how much he collects
on particular segments. To-keep the parallel with quantity competition, we assume
for simplicity that the player sets to zero all but one of the fares he controls.
If we let P denote the sum of all the fares paid by the consumer and let D(P)
denote the market demand function, then the profit of firm i in the second stage is
given by
lr(pj; m) = [pi - c]D(P)
where p1 is the fare charged by firm i and m is the number of players operating at
least one segment after the merger decisions have been taken. Thus P = F__ 1 p.
As the counterpart of Kamien and Zang's assumptions I through III, we assume
for our analysis of price competition with perfect complements:
A. D(P) is twice continuously differentiable, D(P) > 0 and D'(P) < 0 for all
P;>0.
B. The industry total profit function, [P - mc]D(P), has a second derivative
with respect to P which is negative and bounded from below. We denote this
derivative ([P - mc]D(P))". 3
Given these assumptions, there xists a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies.
Consider now the equilibrium of the first stage of the game. Merger behavior
in the first stage depends on the profits which each player anticipates receiving
in each second-stage subgame. Whether under quantity competition with perfect
substitutes or price competition with pefrect complements, each player operating at
least one firm in the second stage receives an equilibrium profit which is a strictly
decreasing function of the number of such players.4 We now clarify the relationship
3Assumption B is the counterpart of Kamien and Zang's assumption III, which, since marginal
production cost is constant, reduces under quantity competition with perfect substitutes to the
industry total revenue function, QP(Q), having a negative second derivative which is bounded from
below.
4For quantity competition with substitutes, see corollary 1 of Kamien and Zang; for price com-
petition with complements, see our appendix.
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between the prior literature on losses from exogenous merger and the generalized
endogenous merger model of Kamien and Zang.
PROPOSITION 1. If a merger would be unprofitable, it will not occur in the Kamien
and Zang model.
Assume there is a loss from a merger of s firms. Now write the second-stage
equilibrium profit of an individual firm when m active firms remain at the end of
the first stage as ar(m) = ir(p(m); m). Then
fr(n - s + 1) < sr(n) (1)
or, equivalently,
r(n - s + 1) < (s - 1)fr(n) + r(n). (2)
Now since gr(m) is a strictly decreasing function of m, 7r(n-s+2) > ir(n) for s 2
2. It follows from (2) that a loss from an exogenous merger implies
fr(n - s + 1) < (s - 1)7r(n - s +F 2) + fr(n). (3)
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that such a merger occurred endogenously.
Then the acquiring player would have to pay at least what the owner of each acquired
firm believes it could earn by holding out unilaterally, in this case r(n - s + 2).5
Let Bi denote the acquiring player's bid for firm j. Without loss of generality, we
may assume j = 1, ... , s - 1. Hence
s-1
E Bj (s - 1)f"r(n - s + 2). (4)
j=1
Substituting into (3), we obtain:
s-1
fr(n - s + 1) < E B + fr(n). (5)
j=1
But if this inequality holds, the acquiring player is better off bidding zero for the
s - 1 firms and operating solo. Hence the merger would not occur in equilibrium.
Note that the only assumptions made about the second-stage is that a pure-strategy,
symmetric equilibrium exists in each subgame and that e profit to each player
is strictly decreasing in the number of players. Hence, this result applies both to
the case of quantity competition with perfect substitutes and to the case of price
competition with perfect complements. This result is useful because SSR partially
characterize those mergers which would be unprofitable and hence identify a subset
of those mergers which will fail to occur in the Kamien and Zang model.
The following proposition also holds:
PROPOSITION 2. Some socially desirable mergers may fail to occur in the Kamien
and Zang model.
It suffices to construct an example. Consider the case of price competition
among providers of perfect complements. Assume marginal cost to be zero and
5To hold out unilaterally, the owner of a targeted firm need merely set its asking price higher
than anyone bids to acquire it.
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D(P) = # - P. In that case, the sum of consumer and producer surplus in an
m-firm industry is given by
(2m+1)/32W (M) - 2(m + 1)2
and W'(m) < 0. Net social surplus being a strictly decreasing function of the
number of active firms in the second stage, any merger is socially desirable in this
context.s SSR showed for the case of quantity competition and perfect substitutes
that with linear demand and identical-linear costs, any merger which includes less
than eighty percent of the firms in the industry will be unprofitable. The same
proposition holds for the case of price competition with perfect complements. Hence,
a merger of two of three railroads with adjoining tracks would cause a loss and, given
proposition 1 above, will not occur even though it would be socially desirable.7
Indeed, complete consolidation, although privately profitable, will also fail to
occur in this three-firm example. With a linear demand and zero cost, individual
firm profit in an m-firm industry is r(m) = #32/(m + 1)2 Suppose one player
attempted to acquire the firms of the other two players. The owner of each target
firm would insist on at least the duopoly profit of /2/9, since each of them expects to
earn that much by unilaterally deviating and operating solo in a two-firm industry.
But this is greater than /2/4 - /32/16, which is the gain to the acquiring firm
of turning this three-firm industry into a monopoly. Hence in this example every
possible merger would be preferable to the outcome of no consolidation which occurs
in equilibrium.
3 Conclusion
Nearly a decade ago, SSR (1983) pointed out an unnoticed peculiarity in the
way mergers and cartelizations had been analyzed: in some exogenous mergers the
post-merger profits of the merged entity are smaller than the sum of the compo-
nent profits prior to the merger. SSR took this as strong evidence of the need to
endogenize the merger decision. Kamien and Zang (1990) have provided one of the
first models where mergers arise endogenously.
As we showed in proposition 1, unprofitable mergers never arise endogenously in
Kamien and Zang's model. Moreover, as the monopolization example at the outset
illustrates, some profitable mergers will not arise in their bidding model because of
the holdout problem.
We have generalized Kamien and Zang's model and have used it to show that
some socially desirable mergers will not occur endogenously. Indeed what occurs
in equilibrium may be socially inferior to every other potential market structure.
Consolidation failures of this sort are, or ought to be, an issue of policy concern.
6Such mergers cause output to eXpand toward the competitive (socially optimal) level.
7The corresponding point can also be made in the context of quantity competition with perfect
substitutes. SSR (1983, p.195) show that if firms have fixed costs there exist cases where an exoge-
nous merger causes a loss to the merging parties but would nonetheless be socially beneficial. Our
proposition 1 holds in this case as well and implies that such desirable mergers would not occur
endogenously. For the inclusion of fixed costs, see also Gaudet and Salant (1992).
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to verify that r(m) is a strictly decreasing
function of m.
At the unique and symmetric equilibrium, it follows from assumption A that
each player operating at least one segment in the second stage charges a price
which is greater than marginal cost. Let p = p(m) > c > 0 denote this common
equilibrium price. From the first-order conditions, it must satisfy
[p - c]D'(mp) + D(mp) = 0. (A-1)
If we multiply through by m, it follows that P(m) = mp(m) must satisfy
[P - mc]D'(P) + D(P) = 0. (A-2)
Differentiating (A-2) totally we find that
D(P(m)) - cD'(P(m))
(m - 1)D'(P(m)) + ([P - mc]D(P(m))"
> 0 for m > 1, from assumption B. (A-3)
This is the counterpart of Kamien and Zang's proposition 1.
Now denote the second-stage aggregate equilibrium profit when m active firms
remain at the end of the first stage by II(m) = mir(m) = mir(p(m); m). We easily
verify that
l'(m) = (m - 1)[p(m) - c]D'(P(m))P'(m)
< 0 by assumption A and inequality (A-3). (A-4)
It follows immediately that
fr'(m) < 0. (A-5)
Inequality (A-4) is the counterpart of Kamien and Zang's proposition 2, while (A-5)
is the counterpart of their corollary 1.
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